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ABSTRACT
The DoD relies on computing devices to accomplish a wide range of goals and
missions[1]. Malicious software jeopardizes these goals and missions. However,
determining whether an arbitrary executable is malicious can be difficult. Obfuscation
tools, called packers, are often used to hide malicious intent from anti-virus programs.
Therefore detecting whether or not an untrusted executable file is packed is a critical step
in software security.
This research uses machine learning methods to build the Polymorphic and
Non-Polymorphic Packer Detection (PNPD) system that detects whether an executable is
packed by either ASPack, UPX, Metasploit’s polymorphic msfencode, or is packed in
general. PNPD detection performance is evaluated on two feature sources. One is
intra-procedural path-insensitive instruction sequences, referred to as i-grams. The other
source, disassembly based features, consists of three sets: 1) control flow graph (CFG)
structural information 2) control flow instructions (CFI), and 3) intermediate language
(IL) representation of the Intel Architecture’s x86 instruction set.
Both feature sources successfully detect packed executables used in experiments.
Overall, it is discovered i-grams provide the best results with accuracies above 99.5%,
average true positive rates above 0.977, and average false positive rates below 1.6e-3
when detecting msfencode packed executables. Grams of sizes 1 and 2 that exclude
operands provide the best packed file detection results. The CFI feature set is the best
performing disassembly source with performance results near that of the best i-grams.
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It is estimated over one billion personal computers were in use in 2008 [15]. These
business, government, and individually owned computers are often targeted by criminals,
terrorists, and enemy nation-states who use malware to confiscate the information,
resources, or systems they contain or control. To mitigate this threat, widely used software
security programs scan and detect executables with malicious intent. But at best, this is a
cat and mouse game as malware creators constantly invent new methods to circumvent
such detection systems employed. One such method is packing. The intent of packing is
to compress or encrypt a malicious executable into a form unrecognized by software
security programs. This leads to a false trust and the ultimate execution of the malware.
To combat this, both static and dynamic based signature, heuristic, and machine learning
methods are used. This research uses a static machine learning based method to detect the
packed executables themselves.
1.2 Problem Statement
The USAF’s and DoD’s goals and missions rely heavily upon commercial software
applications[1]. Therefore, ensuring a software application is not malicious is of critical
importance to national security. To thwart detection of malicious applications, malware
creators often resort to software obfuscation tools and techniques. Polymorphic and
non-polymorphic packers are two such tools. Both types of packers alter the static
1
appearance of an executable but maintain its runtime functionality. However, polymorphic
type packers are more difficult to detect because they use mutation techniques to avoid
signature-based packer detection tools. Because packing can bypass fast static malware
detection methods and simple reverse engineering efforts, determining if an executable is
packed is an important and necessary first step in determining whether to trust an arbitrary
executable.
1.3 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to improve the software security methods available to the
USAF and DoD. To accomplish this, the Polymorphic and Non-Polymorphic Packer
Detection (PNPD) system uses machine learning with sequences of disassembled
instructions and three distinct sets of disassembly based features to determine whether an
executable is packed. The classification performance of these various feature sets is
analyzed via a series of questions that culminate in determining candidates for the best
and worst sets for detection.
1.4 Document Outline
Chapter 2 provides background information and relevant research related to this
effort. Chapter 3 describes the experimental methodology used. Chapter 4 presents the
results and analysis of the experiments conducted. Chapter 5 provides a summary and the
conclusions for this research.
2
2 Background Information
This chapter provides an overview of both x86 based software concepts, malware and
packer basics, and previous research in malware and packer detection.
2.1 Software Analysis Concepts
This section discusses concepts related to the structure and properties of windows
x86 based software.
2.1.1 Static Versus Dynamic Analysis
Static and dynamic analysis are two primary ways of analyzing software and each
have positive and negative characteristics. Static analysis examines the instructions of the
binary executable under analysis but does not execute them. Dynamic analysis executes
the instructions and observes the run-time behavior of the software on either real or virtual
systems. Static analysis methods are commonly used for malware detection by antivirus
programs because they often require less time to perform than dynamic analysis
methods[25].
2.1.2 Recursive Descent versus Linear Sweep Disassemblers
Linear sweep and recursive descent are the two main types of disassembly algorithms
[8]. The linear sweep disassembly algorithm assumes each machine code instruction is
followed by another machine code instruction. Accordingly, the algorithm converts
instructions sequentially relative to the first instruction. A major problem with this
algorithm is it interprets any data in the code section of a program as an instruction. This
leads to de-synchronization with respect to the actual instructions and inaccurate
disassembly as many instructions subsequent to the data may be misinterpreted.
3
Recursive descent algorithms, also called traversal algorithms, such as those used by
IDA Pro [8], use the entry point of a program as the starting point for disassembly and
then disassemble instructions based on the program’s control flow. For example, if a
recursive descent algorithm interprets an instruction as a jump to an offset, the next
instruction decoded is the target of the jump and disassembly continues from there until
the next encountered branch instruction is reached and taken.
2.1.3 Portable Executable Format
Operating systems typically use some type of program header to provide information
on how an executable program is organized, what external applications or libraries it
references, and other attributes of the program to manage its execution. Windows based
systems use the Portable Executable (PE) format to organize the various sections and
other properties of executable files.
The PE format supports a variety of sections that represent different components of a
program, however, not all are used and in many cases sections are combined. For this
reason only the more common .text, .data, .idata, and .rsrc sections are discussed
further.
The .text section usually contains all code generated by the program’s compiler or
assembler, one exception being the Borland C++ compiler which labels the section as
CODE [16]. If the program is linked with multiple object files, the code from each of these
is included in the .text/CODE section. The .data section contains runtime initialized
data for the program’s global and static variables and if multiple object files are linked, the
section contains the combined .data sections of the files. Finally, the .idata section
contains information pertaining to functions imported from DLLs distinct from the
executable which, in many cases, can be most of the functionality of an application.
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2.2 Malware and Packer Concepts
Most of the malware discovered “in the wild” is packed [22] to hide or obfuscate
malicious behavior from reverse engineers, reduce the size of the packed code, and avoid
static pattern matching antivirus detection applications. This section describes concepts
relevant to malware, malware detection, and the techniques and tools used to pack it.
2.2.1 Packers, Compressors, and Protectors
Generally, packers are tools that allow a user to perform compression, encryption,
bundling, or a combination of these on one or more executables or dynamic link libraries
(DLLs) [9, 27]. A “compressor” is a packer that strictly attempts to compresses an
executable and embeds a decompression algorithm that allows the compressed program to
run. A “protector” packer obfuscates and protects the code within a program from
detection by outside parties. Protectors typically accomplish protection through
combinations of various compression, encryption, anti-disassembly, anti-debugging, and
other advanced techniques such as using portable code machines. With respect to malware
detection, packers transform the code and data contained in an executable file into an
obfuscated form, encapsulated within another executable file. Figure 2.1 shows packer
tools used between Feb 2011 and Feb 2012 to obfuscate collected malware samples[22].
Although the code of a packed executable appears changed on disk, packers typically use
what are called packer stubs to maintain the code’s intended behavior at runtime. Thus,
malicious software developers can develop one actual version of their malware and
distribute alternate versions to evade signature-based anti-virus scanners [2]. Additionally,
the functionality of such an application is protected from simple reverse engineering
techniques and application programming interface (API) detection techniques since most
packers hide the original import tables used by the malware.
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Figure 2.1: Packer statistics (Feb ’11 through Feb ’12) [22]
To pack and unpack a program, a packing algorithm transforms the executable code,
data of interest, and relevant resources of an executable into an obfuscated and
compressed state. Typically, a packing tool then inserts this transformed information into
the program by altering the PE structure to accommodate this new information (data) with
a packer stub. The packer stub is usually inserted within one of the new PE sections as
executable code which allows the application or DLL to dynamically unpack and run the
packed code during execution. A typical stub unpacks code by saving the current register
state, performing decompression and or decryption on the target code, loading and linking
original libraries required by the file, restoring the register state, and transferring
execution to the original entry point (OEP) of the unpacked code. At this point the
original, or slightly modified but functionally equivalent, code that was packed is now
unpacked in memory.
2.2.2 Polymorphic versus Non-Polymorphic Packers
Polymorphic packers, such as msfencode, use encryption and mutation techniques to
generate mutated versions of the same packed executable. Potentially millions of
functionally equivalent, but statically altered, versions of the same executable can be
created using polymorphism [25]. However, non-polymorphic packers, such as UPX,
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generate the exact same version of an executable each time is packed. In addition,
non-polymorphic packers without protection methods use the exact or nearly exact
sequences of instructions within the packer stubs they generate. Therefore simple
signature-based detection of non-polymorphic packed executables is possible. Figure 2.2
shows partial disassemblies for the same executable packed with UPX and msfencode.
Figure 2.2: Partial disassemblies for same executable packed by UPX (non-polymorphic)
and msfencode (polymorphic)
2.3 Malware and Packer Detection Research
This section describes static malware and packer detection research efforts, and one
hybrid approach to detect malware and packers.
2.3.1 Pattern Based Malware Detection
Most commercial malware detection systems use pattern matching as a technique to
identify malicious code [3]. This approach searches for patterns of instructions or bytes in
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files to determine whether a unique signature of the malware is present. Although this
syntactic analysis can accurately determine the specific type of malware via exact
identification [25], it cannot typically detect new or modified versions of malware; simple
obfuscation techniques can render a signature based scanner useless against a modified
malware variant [2]. Therefore, many approaches that use pattern based detection
methods attempt to de-obfuscate or interpret and define patterns semantically versus
syntactically. This section describes a few of these efforts.
2.3.1.1 Control Flow Graph Based Signatures. Control flow signatures were
used for worm detection in [12]. Control flow graphs of x86 based executable code
discovered in network traffic was used to generate fingerprints to compare against code
transmitted between computers on a network to determine whether the traffic exhibited
worm-like behavior.
Using k-subgraphs, that is subgraphs of the overall control flow of the executable
code under analysis, the system determines any isomorphic substructures between
captured network traffic containing executable code. To determine the similarity of each
k-subgraph, instructions within these structures are assigned a “color” to characterize the
subgraph. This coloring technique ensures isomorphic k-subgraphs with different
functionality are not considered equivalent. The efficiency of the comparisons is increased
by using canonical graph labeling based on the Nauty library [13]. A worm is deemed
present when matching fingerprints of executable code in network traffic is observed
between a given number of distinct source-destination pairs, the traffic is observed on two
or more internal networked machines, or the traffic was communicated between two or
more hosts external to the network under analysis. The system is capable of identifying
polymorphic worms, but due to its focus on the flow of network traffic versus the analysis
of the executable code itself, high false positive rates occur when valid networked files are
accessed and transmitted by users within the network.
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2.3.1.2 Static Analyzer for Executables. The Static Analyzer for Executables
(SAFE) [4] distinguishes malware from benign code using static code and control flow
abstraction. Although signature based, it is capable of detecting morphed versions of
viruses due to a semantic interpretation of the signature. Generalized versions of both
malicious and non-malicious executables are used. Specifically, abstract representations of
known malicious executables in control flow form are stored in a database and used as
abstraction patterns. This database is referenced by the system when an unknown
executable is encountered to search for known malicious patterns within the executable’s
control flow graph representation. If malicious patterns are matched in the executable, a
positive detection occurs. This particular effort resulted in the detection of viruses with
zero false positives and negatives against the set of viruses tested.
2.3.1.3 Static Analyzer for Vicious Executables. An effort to resolve
detection issues in self-obfuscating malware, [24] proposed the Static Analyzer for
Vicious Executables (SAVE) anti-virus scanner. Unlike SAFE, which uses control flow
graphs, SAVE uses sequences of API calls used by known polymorphic malicious
executables versus the executables themselves.
To determine whether an executable is malicious, the scanner decompresses the PE
file (if compressed), parses the PE binary for the sequence of Windows API calls, and
compares any sequence of API calls against a database of API calling sequence signatures
which contains calling sequences from known variants of viruses that rely on the the
Windows API, or Win32 viruses. API sequences are compared via a score-based sequence
alignment algorithm that calculates a mean value using the Cosine measure [5], extended
Jaccard measure [23], and Pearson correlation measures averaged together. The highest
possible measure for each is one and therefore if the average measurement of a particular
executable in question exceeds a 0.90 threshold value, it is considered malicious.
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The SAVE scanner is implemented in [26] and detects all Mydoom, Bika, Beagle,
and Blaster variants with perfect accuracy and outperforms the SAFE scanner based on
time to scan Win32 PE files of various sizes.
2.3.2 Machine Learning Based Methods
Machine learning uses previously learned experiences to make decisions not possible
with signature based methods alone. Unlike searching for specific patterns, heuristics use
a historical approach and bases decisions on basic patterns from previous samples of
identified malware and non-malware. This allows previously unseen malware to be
detected. Furthermore, unlike signature based methods which require new signatures be
added to an ever-growing collection, machine learning based solutions avoid significant
amounts of storage overhead by using relatively small decision structures and classifiers
built from training sets. However, machine learning based approaches have drawbacks as
well. Two include the need to correctly identify and provide sufficient training samples as
well as higher false positive rates. Several machine learning based malware detection
schemes are discussed below.
2.3.2.1 Mining DLL Function Calls. Research performed by [18], uses a set
of malicious and non-malicious MS-DOS based programs to train and test the accuracy of
several data mining classifiers. The effort ultimately produced a detection rate of 97.76%.
An up-to-date virus scanner differentiated between malicious and non-malicious
executables for 4,266 files and it is assumed the scanner correctly identified each type. The
two groups of executables are then split into training and test sets. Features extracted from
the binary profiles of each executable consist of referenced DLLs, DLL function calls
within the binary, the total number of function calls within the referenced DLLs, strings
within the raw executable file, and byte strings obtained from hexadecimal editor dumps.
The features are used to create RIPPER, Naı̈ve Bayes, and Multi-Naı̈ve Bayes classifiers.
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The RIPPER algorithm is an inductive rule-based learner trained with the set of DLL
function features extracted. The specific set of rules that define a malicious executable
include no call to user32.EndDialog(), but a call to
kernel32.EnumCalendarInfoA(); no call to user32.LoadIconA(),
kernel32.GetTempPathA(), or any function in advapi32.dll DLL; one or more calls
to shell32.ExtractAssociatedIconA(); one or more calls to functions in Microsoft
Visual Basic Library DLL. If none of these conditions are met, the RIPPER algorithm
deems the executable non-malicious. The Naı̈ve Bayes classifier is trained with the sets of
extracted strings and byte sequences. The multi-class classifier consists of six Naı̈ve
Bayes classifiers, each voting whether a particular unknown sample exhibits malicious
behavior or not.
With regard to overall accuracy and detection rates, the Naı̈ve Bayes algorithm and
associated string features were the most accurate at 97.11% and produced the lowest false
positive rate at 3.8%. The multi-Naı̈ve Bayes and associated byte string features resulted
in the second highest overall accuracy of 96.88% with false positive rates at 6.01%. The
RIPPER algorithm and associated DLL features resulted in overall accuracies of 83.62%
for the DLLs used feature set, 89.36% for DLL feature set, and 89.07% for DLLs with
counted function calls.
2.3.2.2 N-Gram Classifiers. Similarly successful malware detection results
were achieved by [11] using n-gram based feature extraction and classification techniques
that produced a detector with 0.996 area under ROC curve.
Four-byte n-grams for 1,651 malicious executables and 1,971 non-malicious
executables are created and consist of overlapping bytes that result in 255,904,403 total
n-grams. As an example of 4-byte n-gram extraction, the following byte sequence of
bytes, 0x3FA1C935779B, would generate 3 unique n-grams consisting of 0x3FA1C935,
0xA1C93577, and 0x935779B. These unique n-grams are sorted by their calculated
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Naı̈ve Bayes, support vector machine, and decision tree classification methods are applied
to the top 500 sorted n-grams per experimental run. In addition, a boosted support vector
machine, Naı̈ve Bayes, and decision tree are used as classifiers. The 0.996 area under
ROC curve was achieved for the boosted decision tree classifier.
In addition to detection, malicious executables were also classified. Malicious
executables are grouped into training and test sets for each class of malicious type. The
same feature extraction and classification methods were used to produce results for three
different types of malware: mass-mailer, backdoor, and executable virus with less
successful results.
2.3.2.3 Malware Target Recognition. The Malware Target Recognition
(MaTR) system [6] uses anomaly and structural features based on attributes of the PE
structure of executables to determine whether a given executable is malicious. MaTR is
contrasted against the performance of successful n-gram based research and is shown to
outperform n-grams with statistical significance. In addition, MaTR uses only over 100
features and avoids the overhead n-grams incur with feature extraction and selection of
grams from the millions of grams generated since the features extracted require little
overhead to process. This effort yielded malware detection accuracies above 99.9%, false
positive rates below 8.73e-4 and false negative rates below 8.03e-4.
2.3.3 Packer Detection
This section discusses research efforts that detect and or automatically unpack packed
code.
2.3.3.1 PolyUnpack. [17] formally defines executables that unpack
themselves prior to execution and additionally implements an automated un-packing tool.
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The definition of an unpack-executing program is any program that executes
instructions present at runtime in the text or data sections that are not decoded as the same
instructions before the program is loaded. In addition, instructions determined to be
executable in the code section, or those which were before the program was executed, also
classify an executable as an unpack-executing program. This definition is used in the
PolyUnpack tool which compares an executable before and after it is loaded to detect
packed code and capture its unpacked representation.
To automatically unpack code, PolyUnpack statically analyzes an executable,
executes it step-by-step and then compares the before execution and after execution
instructions of the executable. If an instruction loaded in the program counter during the
execution phase of detection cannot be found in any of the instructions from the static
analysis of the executable, it is deemed an unpacked instruction. Executable code packed
multiple times, i.e., packed code in packed code, is also detected by re-accomplishing the
entire static-dynamic analysis process on each unpacked section of code up to a chosen
number of iterations so that once one level of unpacking has finished, the system attempts
another iteration of unpacking starting at the first instruction of the unpacked code
previously discovered. Instructions within DLL calls are noted during the dynamic
analysis phase but not analyzed.
Determining whether a program exhibits unpack-execute behavior is not decidable
and reduces PolyUnpack’s recognition to the Turing Halting problem. Therefore, the
authors restrict the number of instructions executed during analysis of a program to a
sufficiently low value.
PolyUnpack obtained generally better results than PEiD, a popular and free packer
identifier, discovering 1,754 instances of packed executables versus 1,482 for PEiD, out of
a total of 3,467 total samples. However, the number of actual packed executables in the
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overall sample set and whether the most recent PEiD signatures were used is unknown,
leaving doubt as to the actual performance of the system.
2.3.3.2 PE File Header Analysis. The packed file detection technique
developed by [20] detects packed executables based on features extracted from their PE
headers. The characteristic vector of an eight element vector reveals variations that
indicate a file is packed. The eight characteristic entities include values based on the
number of executable and writable sections, the number of non-executable sections
containing executable code, the number of unprintable section header names, whether
there are any “no execute” sections, and whether the sum of all section sizes are larger
than the file’s overall size. These were chosen based on heuristic analysis performed on
packed and non-packed files. One hundred packed samples were analyzed and the
distances between the features compared to produce a minimum distance threshold to
distinguish packed from unpacked files. Experimental results yielded 93.6% detection and
4% false positive rates.
2.4 Opcode Based N-Grams
2.4.1 Unknown Malcode Detection Using OPCODE Representation
Research conducted in [14] applies a new and successful method of n-gram based
classification for malware detection using sample set of over 30,000 files. Instead of using
the sequences of bytes contained within executable files, this research extracts sequences
of opcodes, the operation portion of an instruction. These sequences are labeled as
‘OpCodes’. The OpCodes are based on the disassembly provided by the IDA Pro
disassembler. The authors state the sequences are created “in the same logical order in
which the OpCodes appear in the executable” and are based on “execution flow of
machine operations...” which implies control flow is respected, but a concrete example of
extraction is not available.
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The research centers around several questions regarding feature weighting, sequence
size performance, top-selection method performance, classifier performance, and the
classification imbalance problem. Term frequency and term frequency inverse document
frequency are used for feature weighting comparisons. Individual sequence sizes from 1
to 6 were tested separately as features, versus combinations of sizes. The top 50, 100, 200,
and 300 for along with document frequency, gain ratio and Fisher score are used to
evaluate selection performance. Artificial Neural Networks, Decision Tree (unspecified
version), Naı̈ve Bayes, and the Adaboost.M1 versions were used for classifier
performance comparisons. Finally, 5, 10, 15, 30, and 50 percent ratios of malware to
non-malware are tested as classification training sets.
Performance results include an accuracy above 99% for OpCodes against a training
set consisting of 15% malicious samples. The research results in best performance for
sequences of size 2 versus other sizes and shows that larger sizes decrease accuracy. The
Fisher score provides the best performance overall with the top 300 features and term
frequency text categorization. The boosted decision tree, decision tree, and neural network
classifiers provided the best classification performance.
2.4.2 Detecting Unknown Malicious Code by Applying Classification
Techniques on OpCode patterns
A subsequent OpCode research effort conducted in [21] extends the results of [14].
The performance results for combined gram sizes is measured and how often a classifier
should be trained is determined in addition to several questions from the previous work.
The effort shows no performance gains when OpCodes of different sizes are combined
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Determining whether an arbitrary program executable is malicious or not is a
perennial problem. Malicious programs routinely steal usernames and passwords,
confiscate personal information, and take control of machines [19] each month. Static and
dynamic program analysis approaches assist in combating the propagation and use of such
malicious programs. Of the two analysis methods, the static method is a popular approach
because it analyzes programs in their pre or non-runtime states and avoids overhead
dynamic methods incur with real or emulated execution of programs. Packing, however,
can prevent static analysis by compressing, encrypting, or performing a combination of
these two operations on compiled code. Thus, packing an executable potentially renders
ineffective many static analysis techniques such as signature and heuristic based methods.
3.2 Problem Definition
This section describes the goals, hypothesis, and approach for this research.
3.2.1 Goals and Hypotheses
Packing an executable produces a statically different and often unrecognizable
version of an executable through the compression and or encryption of its bytes. Because
packing obfuscates the original bytes of an executable, simple static analysis methods may
not recognize packed malicious applications. Packers typically use routines called packer
stubs that decompress or decode packed code and data into program memory space when
the program executes. Once unpacked in memory, the executable’s original instructions
and data are restored to their original state. Thus, if only static signature-based methods
are employed for malware detection, a packed malicious application might execute
undetected. Because the packer stub routines are typically the only code visible to static
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methods, signature-based detection tools often target stub instruction bytes. For
non-polymorphic packers, such as UPX and ASPack, the packer stubs generated typically
consist of similar instructions and control flow structures independent of the executable
they pack. Therefore, signature-based detection of UPX and ASPack packed executables
is fast and effective. However, polymorphic packers, such as Metasploit’s msfencode tool,
use engines that produce mutated versions of the same executable and packer stub each
time the file is packed. Signature-based detection by virus scanners and packer detectors
often miss such polymorphic packers.
This research evaluates polymorphic, non-polymorphic, and general packed detection
performance of several disassembly based feature sets in conjunction with machine
learning methods. These sets consist of two main sources. One uses intra-procedural
path-insensitive instruction sequences (i-grams) with configuration options to include the
size of the grams and whether the op-codes of the instructions or both op-codes and
operands constitute the grams. The second source consists of three sets of generalized
disassembly based features: a control flow graph (CFG) set, a control flow instructions
(CFI) set, and an intermediate language (IL) set. A total of four classes representing two
non-polymorphic based, one polymorphic based, and one general packed class are used.
The general packed class provides classification results for packed versus not packed
executables, similar to previous works that classify malicious from non-malicious
executables. This research attempts to answer the following questions:
• Can i-grams be used to detect polymorphic and non-polymorphic packer tools?
• What packed classes do i-grams classify best?
• What gram sizes for i-grams perform the best?
• Do i-grams with or without operands provide better classification performance?
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• What are the overall best and worst i-gram configuration candidates for packer
classification?
• Can the CFG, CFI, and IL feature sets be used to detect polymorphic and
non-polymorphic packer tools?
• What packed classes do the CFG, CFI, and IL feature sets classify best?
• What is the best choice for packer classification between CFG, CFI, and IL feature
sets?
• What feature sets are the overall best and worst between the i-gram and CFG, CFI,
and IL feature sets?
Based on previous research [14, 21], 2-grams are expected to perform the best for the
i-gram group. It is expected that including operands with the grams will have a negative
impact on polymorphic detection performance because they make each instruction in the
gram more specific. In addition, classification results for the non-polymorphic classes
should achieve the highest results because the disassembled code they produce is static
compared to polymorphic packers. CFG, CFI, and IL feature sets are expected to classify
and detect various packers fairly well based on pilot experiments, but no conjecture is
made as to which one will perform the best. As a group, they are expected to perform
better on the two UPX and ASPack non-polymorphic classes, similar to i-grams.
3.2.2 Approach
Static disassembly provides meaningful information about an arbitrary executable.
Instructions and subsequent control flow information are used by reverse software
engineers to understand the intent of an executable. This research uses disassembly
information generated by the IDA Pro disassembler in conjunction with BinNavi, a control
flow graph and intermediate language generation tool, to extract i-gram, CFG, CFI, and IL
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features from a large set of packed and non-packed executables. The packed sample set
executables are created with several freely available packer tools. The non-packed
executables are gathered from a fresh install of Windows XP service pack 2. Non-packed,
polymorphic packed, and non-polymorphic packed type executables within this sample set
provide both training and testing sets to build and test decision tree based classification.
Classification results answer the performance questions poised in the previous section.
3.3 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Polymorphic and Non-Polymorphic Packer
Detection (PNPD) system. It consists of the components shown in Figure 3.1. The IDA
Pro disassembler component converts the code and data sections of 32-bit Windows PE
executable files, into Intel Architecture (IA) 32-bit instructions. BinNavi’s control flow
graph generator organizes the disassembled instructions by procedure into basic blocks
with paths that describe the execution flow of the instructions and transforms IA
instructions into a proprietary intermediate language. The feature extraction component
extracts the i-gram, CFG, CFI, and IL sets of features from all procedures for each
executable. Finally, the classification component uses the extracted features and
associated classes to train and test a J48 decision tree classifier. The classification
component is the component under test (CUT) and its classification output represents the
SUT’s output. This output is used to derive the accuracy, true positive rate, and false
positive rate metrics used for performance evaluation. Finally, the SUT’s workload
consists of packed and non-packed executable files and their associated classes.
3.4 System Services
The PNPD system detects whether an executable has been packed by either a
polymorphic or non-polymorphic based packer. The output of the system is a
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Figure 3.1: Polymorphic and Non-Polymorphic Packer Detection (PNPD) System
classification result that represents either a true positive, false positive, true negative, or
false negative. System output depends on the classification class sets used to train the J48
decision tree component. This research refers to a true positive as a result that correctly
identifies an executable within the classification class being detected. A false positive
occurs when the classifier result incorrectly indicates an executable is not in the
classification class when it actually is in the class. A true negative occurs when an
executable not in the classified class is detected as such. Finally, a false negative occurs
when an executable within the classified class is incorrectly determined as not in the class.
3.5 Workload
The workload for the PNPD system consists of packed and non-packed Win32 PE
executables. It is restricted to Win32 x86-based executables due to the disassembly tools
and packing software available for this format. Packed versions of windows system files
are created using several freely available packers and constitute one set of workload input.
These exercise the PNPD system’s ability to detect both polymorphic and
non-polymorphic packed files.
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Workload parameters include whether a file is packed or not, the packer used to
compress an executable, the version of the packer, configuration setting for the packer if
applicable, and a class type associated with a file. These parameters directly affect the
classification training and testing results, and therefore the overall classification
performance of the system.
3.6 Performance Metrics
System performance is based on the ability of the system to accurately detect packed
files as determined by the following:
True Positive Rate (TPR): A ratio of packed executables classified as such. This is
calculated as the number of hits over the sum of the number of hits plus the number
misses for the executable classified.
False Positive Rate (FPR): A ratio of non-packed executables incorrectly classified
as packed. This is defined as the number of false positives over the sum of the false
positives plus the true negatives for the executables classified.
Accuracy (ACC): A percentage of packed and non-packed executables correctly
classified as such. This is defined as the sum of the true positives and the true
negatives over the sum of the true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false
negatives for the executables classified.
3.7 System Parameters
The following parameters affect the PNPD system’s performance:
Decision Tree (DT) Type: The DT type affects the ability of the PNPD system to
detect packed executables. Classifier type trees are available in different variations.
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Decision Tree Configuration: The DT’s configuration options affect classification
accuracy. Various options are configurable and differ from one DT type to another.
Sample Sets Used to Train Decision Tree: The sample sets that train the DT can
greatly impact classification performance results and must be chosen carefully to
assure adequate training and meaningful testing. This ultimately determines how
well the DT can resolve whether an executable is packed or not.
Packer Tools Used: Different packers or combinations of packers that are classified
will lead to different classification performance results. Some packers generate
packed files that are detected with greater accuracy versus other packed files
Obfuscation Techniques in Executables: Obfuscation techniques can hide features
that would otherwise be extracted from the disassembled instructions and associated
CFG of an executable. The feature set chosen must account for obfuscation
techniques or assume obfuscation techniques are not used.
Type of Packing: Packers, in general, compress or encrypt executables or perform a
combination of these functions. The function of the packer stub is coupled with the
function of packer and therefore exhibits different characteristics. To build a robust
DT, the type of packing must be accounted for with sufficient training samples.
Features Selection: The specific features chosen have a large impact on
classification performance. However, due to the dimensional reduction inherent in
DTs, all features chosen are used to build the DT classifier for packer stubs.
Number of Features: The number of features used to build a decision tree can
negatively affect the DT’s ability to accurately determine whether an executable
contains a packer stub. If too few features are used, the DT runs the risk of not
23
having enough features to split on, therefore reducing the accuracy of a DT
determined result.
Algorithm Used for Feature Extraction: The algorithm that extracts features from
the disassembled instructions and control flow graphs of executables affects the time
required to process a request. Depending on the desired set of features, the
algorithm may also impact the quality of information provided to the DT. For
instance, if various forms and sequences of no-operation instructions is a sought
after feature, the algorithm must understand the semantic equality between the NOP
instruction and two NOT AX instructions used in succession.
Control Flow Graph Generator: Responsible for the input into the feature
extraction component and therefore coupled with overall performance of the SUT.
Disassembler Type: Determines the way instructions are decoded. A recursive
descent type disassembler decodes instructions by following the control flow of
decoded instructions. A linear sweep type disassembler ignores control flow and
decodes instructions assuming one instruction follows another. Recursive descent
typically provides a more accurate representation of an executable’s instructions [8].
3.8 Factors
Factors are split into three groups. One for the i-gram features, one for the
disassembly based features, and another for both. These are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.8.1 i-gram configuration factors
The following i-gram configuration factors are tested:
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i-gram size: The i-gram size is the number of instructions in the instruction
sequence. For instance, an i-gram of size 2 would only consist of two sequential
instructions. Sizes 1 through 5 are used for experimentation.
Operand inclusion: Operands can either be included or not included for i-gram
sequences of instructions.
3.8.2 Disassembly based features configuration factors
The following disassembly based feature configuration factors are tested:
Feature set: The set of disassembly based features used for classification. Three
sets are used. One consists of structural attributes of control flow graphs labeled as
the CFG feature set. Another consists of the percentages of all IA x86 control flow
instructions. The last consist of percentages based on IA x86 instructions translated
into a proprietary set of intermediate language instructions.
3.8.3 i-gram and disassembly based features configuration factors
The following configuration factors are tested for both the i-gram and disassembly
based features groups:
Classification class: This determines what class is classified. UPX, ASPack,
Polymorphic, and Packed classes are used for experimentation.
3.9 Class Sample Set Creation and Descriptions
3.9.1 Non-packed executables
The non-packed executable files use for experiments consist of 623 Windows
executables gathered from a fresh install of Windows XP SP2. Sizes for these files range
from 1KB to 3.5MB with a median of 52KB and an average slightly above 153KB.
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Table 3.1: Factors and factor levels for the PNPD system experiments
Group Factor Levels
i-grams
i-gram size 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Operand inclusion included, excluded
Disassembly based features Feature set CFG set, CFI set, IL set





The packed executables used in the experiments are created by packing a subset of
the non-packed Windows executables. A total of 1879 packed samples are used. Table 3.2
summarizes the various packers and versions used. The composition of each packed
classification class sample set is discussed below and visible in figure 3.2.
3.9.2.1 UPX. The 650 UPX packed executable files are created using four
versions of UPX, specifically 1.2, 1.24, 2.03, and 3.08. Different configuration options are
used for several versions, but preliminary investigation revealed that with one exception,
neither changes in settings or version altered the features extracted from the compressed
executable outputs. The notable exception for this is the LZMA option that is available in
UPX version 3.08. Setting this option produced obvious differences in both the
disassembled instructions and control flow graphs. For this reason, Table 3.2 only
identifies the LZMA option for UPX. This class consists of the 650 UPX executables
which are classified against the remaining 1229 packed and 623 non-packed executables
from the sample pool.
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(a) UPX class samples (b) ASPack class samples
(c) Poly class samples (d) Packed class samples
Figure 3.2: Executable sample sets for all classification classes
3.9.2.2 ASPack. The 392 ASPack packed executable files are generated using
seven different versions of ASPack, versions 2.0, 2.1, 2.11, 2.12, 2.2, 2.24, and 2.28.
Preliminary investigation indicates that 2.12, 2.2, and 2.24 produce the same IDA Pro
disassembly results consisting of two functions with only six instructions total between
them. The samples for this class consist of the 392 ASPack executables which are
classified against the remaining 1487 packed and 623 non-packed executables from the
sample pool.
3.9.2.3 Polymorphic. The polymorphic packed executable files are generated
using the msfencode tool included with Metasploit version 4.3.0. Specifically, msfencode
embeds a reverse tcp payload into a total of 15 different non-packed executables with both
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the generic/none and x86/shikata ga nai encoders. Numerous iterations using the 15 files
create the total 405 polymorphic packed samples used in experiments. The msfencode
tool generates a different, hence polymorphically packed, executable for each iteration it
outputs regardless of the encoder used. In other words, if the same executable, payload,
and generic/none encoder are used three times, the resulting three different executables
will have three different disassemblies generated. Therefore, the encoder chosen for
msfencode seems irrelevant, but is still noted in the table below for completeness. This
class consists of 450 msfencode executables which are classified against the remaining
1474 packed and 623 non-packed executables.
3.9.2.4 Packed. The Packed classification class represents a generalized
packed class of both polymorphic and non-polymorphic packed samples. It is composed
of all the packed samples from the UPX, ASPack, and Polymorphic classification classes
with additional samples generated from several other packer tools. Specifically, the FSG,
MPRESS, nPack, PEPaCK, and Yoda Protector tools. These additional tools do not use
polymorphic techniques. As a result, the majority of samples for the packed set are of the
non-polymorphic type. This class of 1879 packed executables is classified against the
remaining set of all 623 non-packed executables.
3.10 Feature Set Description and Extraction
This section describes the i-gram, CFI, CFG, and IL features sets and the methods
used to extract them.
3.10.1 i-grams
For each executable used in the experiments, unique i-grams are extracted from every
procedure produced by the IDA Pro disassembler and combined. i-Grams are represented
as strings of instruction sequences extracted from the control flow graphs of the
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Table 3.2: Sample sets used for experiments



























procedures. Therefore, i-grams of size 2 or more incorporate instruction sequences that
follow control flow while grams of size 1 do not. In addition, markers for nodes without
entry or exit edges are also generated for i-grams of size 2 or greater. These are
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represented as a question mark character in the i-gram strings. To further illustrate this,
consider the sample control flow graph generated for a procedure in Figure 3.3. Extraction
for 1-grams without operands generates the following 5 unique i-grams: (cmp), (jbe),
(esi), (mov), (jmp). Extraction for 2-grams without operands generates 9 unique grams
consisting of the following: (?/cmp), (cmp/jbe), (jbe/inc), (jbe/mov), (inc/mov),
(mov/jmp), (jmp/cmp), (mov/cmp), (cmp/?).
Figure 3.3: Sample control flow graph
i-grams without operands use only the mnemonics, or opcodes, of instructions.
i-grams with operands include the operands in the string representation of the i-gram.
However, all numerical values within operands are generalized to a hash character for the
string representation of the i-grams with operands. For example, 1-grams with operands
consist of the following 7 unique i-gram strings for the sample figure: (cmp;byte
ds:[esi];byte #), (jbe;loc #), (inc;esi), (mov;ss:[ebp+var#];esi),
(jmp;loc #), (mov;byte al;byte ds:[esi]), (cmp;byte al;byte bl).









is applied to the unique grams based on what
classification class is tested. The i-grams are sorted by information gain values and the top
500 are selected for classification use.
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3.10.2 CFG, CFI, and IL feature sets
All features for the CFG, CFI, and IL sets use values based on percentages and
averages. CFG features are generated from the structural attributes of control flow graphs
for each executable. CFI features are created from the counts of control flow instructions
in each executable. Finally, the IL set is based on Reverse Engineering Intermediate
Language (REIL) instructions [7] generated by the BinNavi application for each
disassembled executable. Further details on each feature set is discussed below.
3.10.2.1 CFG structural features. Their are 14 CFG structural features. All
are averages or percentages relating to control flow based information such as the average
number of instructions per block, average number of instructions per loop, and
percentages of different types of edges.
3.10.2.2 CFI features. A total of 30 CFI features are generated by computing
the percentage of all instructions each control flow instruction accounts for. As an
example, if a total of 100 instructions are generated by the disassembly of an executable,
and out of the 100 instructions 3 are jnz instructions, the jnz feature value is 3 percent.
Control flow instructions include all variants of the x86 jump, return, call, loop, and
other control flow instructions. Percentages are chosen over the frequency of control flow
instructions to provide more generalized values for classification.
3.10.2.3 IL features. The IL feature set consists of 22 REIL-based percentage
values. Seventeen are the percentage of all REIL instructions in an executable that each
REIL instruction accounts for. For example, a disassembled executable might contain the
and instruction a total of 5 times out of a total of 100 instructions. A value of .05 is
therefore calcalated for the and feature. The other 5 features are based on the arithmetic,
bitwise, data transfer, logical, and “other” REIL categories of instruction functions. For
example, an executable might consist of 10 percent arithmetic, 30 percent bitwise, 30
31
percent data transfer, 25 percent logical, and 5 percent other types of instructions
functions.
3.11 Evaluation Technique
Direct measurement is used to assess the PNPD system. Both simulation and analytic
techniques would require the design and implementation of systems more complex than a
working system.
Various sets of packed and non-packed executable samples are processed using the
Weka 3.6 machine learning software [10] to evaluate the PNPD system. The PNPD
system, IDA Pro, BinNavi, and Weka run on a computer with 64-bit Windows 7 operating
system, dual quad core 2.0 GHz processors, and 24GB RAM. IDA Pro 5.7 is used to
disassemble executables. BinNavi 4.05 is used for control flow graph generation and
provides the REIL instructions used as features. The PNPD system’s output is the comma
separated file generated by the Weka experimental environment. The file provides the
tabulated classification results for each experiment run.
3.12 Experimental Design
A full factorial design is used to test the system. To ensure robust results, a stratified
ten-fold cross-validation method creates the pseudo-random folds required for classifier
training and testing.
For each experiment, the 2502 executables used in all experiments are divided into
two sets. One set represents all executables in the class specified by the classification class
factor level and the other set contains all remaining executables out of the total 2502 not in
the selected classification class. Stratified 10-fold cross validation with random sampling
is used. Each fold is tested against the Weka J48 decision tree implementation[10] trained
by the other nine folds.
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There are 5 size and 2 operand inclusion levels for the i-gram factors. The CFG, CFI,
and IL sets represent the 3 feature set levels for the disassembly group. There are 4
classification class levels for both the i-gram and disassembly groups. Combined with the
10 cross-validation trials, a total of (5 i-gram sizes x 2 i-gram inclusion levels + 3
disassembly feature sets) x 4 classification classes x 10 folds = 520 experiments are
generated.
With 20 replications, each generating new randomized folds, the total number of
experiments is 520 x 20 = 10400. A 0.99 confidence level is used.
3.13 Methodology Summary
Obfuscation methods are often used to hide the malicious intent of malware from
reverse engineers and software security applications. Polymorphic and non-polymorphic
based packers transform the bytes and instructions of an executable into a form statically
unrecognizable from their original form. This chapter outlines the packer detection goals
of this research and the experimental approach and setup this research uses. Specifically,
the PNPD system, which detects both polymorphic and non-polymorphic packing, is
described. Operation is limited to x86 based 32-bit PE executables. A mixed set of both
packed and non-packed Win32 executables with ten-fold cross-validation generates the
training and test samples. Several common packers, including UPX, ASPack, and
Metasploit’s msfencode tool, generate the packed samples. A full-factorial design ensures
all factor effects are observed.
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4 Results and Analysis
This chapter begins with discussion of possible classification performance inflation
due to the composition of sample sets used in experiments. It then answers several
questions poised earlier regarding classification performance for the i-gram and
disassembly features. Accuracy, true positive rate, and false positive rate metrics describe
classification performance results. In addition, quantitative and qualitative observations
describe the computational and resource requirements of the various i-gram and
disassembly feature configurations. More emphasis is placed on results for msfencode
polymorphic packed executable detection classification results as UPX and ASPack are
easily detected using signature based methods.
4.1 I-gram Results and Analysis
This section discusses the results of all i-gram configurations.
4.1.1 Results across all i-gram configurations
This section discusses results across all i-gram configurations organized by class.
4.1.1.1 Non-polymorphic classes. The non-polymorphic UPX and ASPack
classes result in good classification performance. UPX packed executables are detected
with average accuracies at or above 99.76% and ASPack executables at or above 99.4%
for all i-gram configurations. Further results and associated reasons are discussed further
in this section.
Accuracy results in Table 4.1 show a general pattern of higher accuracy as gram size
increases and when operands are included. UPX is detected with perfect accuracy at gram
sizes of 2 or greater when operands are included and gram sizes of 3 or greater when
operands are excluded. These results are expected. As gram size increases so does the
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Table 4.1: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for i-grams on
UPX class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
UPX/1 Gram/Excluded 99.76221 99.70604 – 99.81837 0.99854 0.99766 – 0.99942 0.00270 0.00197 – 0.00343
UPX/1 Gram/Included 99.96001 99.93789 – 99.98213 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00054 0.00024 – 0.00084
UPX/2 Gram/Excluded 99.95402 99.92726 – 99.98078 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00062 0.00026 – 0.00098
UPX/2 Gram/Included 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
UPX/3 Gram/Excluded 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
UPX/3 Gram/Included 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
UPX/4 Gram/Excluded 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
UPX/4 Gram/Included 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
UPX/5 Gram/Excluded 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
UPX/5 Gram/Included 100.00000 100.00000 – 100.00000 1.00000 1.00000 – 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
specificity of a gram’s context of an executable. As an exaggerated example, consider a
gram size of 100. Grams of this size extracted from the disassembled instructions of a
particular executable are specific to that executable. Finding a similar gram consisting of
the same sequence of 100 instructions in another executable is unlikely to occur unless the
the same procedures are present in both executables. Such is the case, however, for UPX
packed executables where the packer stub procedure used does not vary significantly or at
all between files packed by UPX. Therefore, as gram size increases, they are more specific
and identify longer sequences of instructions specific to only UPX packed executables.
The other extreme is represented by 1-grams which are considered the most general of the
gram sizes. They are defined by a single instruction and contain no control flow
information and therefore provide the smallest context about an executable’s disassembly.
For example, a 1-gram consisting of the call instruction alone is far too general to
discern between a UPX packed executable and any other arbitrary executable.
Furthermore, the inclusion of operands increases specificity of grams. This is clearly
evident within UPX results as 2-grams with operands included detect UPX with perfect
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accuracy. When operands are excluded, however, 2-grams are no longer specific enough
to detect UPX with perfect accuracy.
Table 4.2: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for i-grams on
ASPack class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
ASPACK/1 Gram/Excluded 99.40449 99.31668 – 99.49231 0.97170 0.96714 – 0.97626 0.00180 0.00123 – 0.00237
ASPACK/1 Gram/Included 99.83018 99.78334 – 99.87701 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00012 -1e-04 – 0.00034
ASPACK/2 Gram/Excluded 99.76819 99.70862 – 99.82776 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00085 0.00039 – 0.00131
ASPACK/2 Gram/Included 99.68029 99.61733 – 99.74324 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00190 0.00139 – 0.00241
ASPACK/3 Gram/Excluded 99.77023 99.71741 – 99.82305 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00083 5e-04 – 0.00116
ASPACK/3 Gram/Included 99.84015 99.79595 – 99.88436 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
ASPACK/4 Gram/Excluded 99.84015 99.79595 – 99.88436 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
ASPACK/4 Gram/Included 99.84015 99.79595 – 99.88436 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
ASPACK/5 Gram/Excluded 99.55833 99.48449 – 99.63217 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00334 0.00261 – 0.00408
ASPACK/5 Gram/Included 99.84015 99.79595 – 99.88436 0.98980 0.98699 – 0.99262 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
ASPack detection results are shown in Table 4.1 and roughly follow the same pattern
as those for UPX with notable differences for 5-grams without operands and 2-grams with
operands configurations. Overall, the 1, 3, 4, and 5-gram with operands and 4-gram
without operands configurations provide similar higher average accuracy results. The
lowest average accuracy, approximately 99.83% occurs for the 1-gram without operands
configuration. This accuracy is attributable to a relatively low true positive rate of 0.972
versus true positive rates of 0.99 and above for all other configurations. Results for
5-grams and 2-grams with operands configurations contrast the perfect classification
results observed for UPX. The lower ASPack performance for these and 1-gram without
operands configurations are likely due to the limited disassembly that IDA Pro produces
for the 2.12, 2.2, and 2.24 versions of ASPack. IDA disassembly produces only two
functions, one with a ‘pusha, call’ sequence and the other with a ‘pop ebp, inc
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ebp, push ebp, retn’ sequence. These short and general instruction sequences
comprise nearly half of the ASPack samples used to build the classification training and
test sets used for experimentation and negatively affects performance results.
4.1.1.2 Polymorphic (msfencode) class. Classification results for executables
packed by Metasploit’s msfencode tool are good with average accuracies above 97.0% for
all configurations. Table 4.3 shows accuracies, true positive rates, and false positive rates
for all i-gram configurations.
Table 4.3: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for i-grams on
Poly class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
POLY/1 Gram/Excluded 99.19060 99.10481 – 99.27638 0.96865 0.96326 – 0.97403 0.00360 0.00285 – 0.00435
POLY/1 Gram/Included 99.37447 99.28708 – 99.46186 0.96137 0.95597 – 0.96678 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
POLY/2 Gram/Excluded 99.50239 99.42084 – 99.58394 0.97745 0.97327 – 0.98163 0.00157 0.00086 – 0.00229
POLY/2 Gram/Included 99.56035 99.4874 – 99.6333 0.97783 0.97374 – 0.98191 0.00095 0.00058 – 0.00133
POLY/3 Gram/Excluded 99.30053 99.20256 – 99.39851 0.97350 0.96717 – 0.97982 0.00322 0.00236 – 0.00408
POLY/3 Gram/Included 99.17264 99.07558 – 99.2697 0.94891 0.94292 – 0.95491 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
POLY/4 Gram/Excluded 99.14258 99.04809 – 99.23707 0.95273 0.94704 – 0.95842 0.00110 0.00067 – 0.00152
POLY/4 Gram/Included 98.47115 98.35151 – 98.59079 0.90559 0.89822 – 0.91295 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
POLY/5 Gram/Excluded 98.22553 98.08166 – 98.3694 0.90426 0.89564 – 0.91287 0.00267 0.00203 – 0.00331
POLY/5 Gram/Included 97.00237 96.84484 – 97.15989 0.81662 0.80706 – 0.82618 0.00033 -2e-05 – 0.00069
A maximum average accuracy is observed at 2-gram configurations with diminishing
accuracies as gram size increases from thereon. This contradicts the general increase in
accuracy with increase in gram size observed for the non-polymorphic UPX and ASPack
results due to the specificity of grams. As gram sizes increase, the specificity of context
grows. For the non-polymorphic packed executables with similar or identical procedures,
grams with greater sizes increase the information gained. This occurs because similar and
longer instruction sequences common to all or most executables packed with a specific
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non-polymorphic packer are less likely present in executables not packed by the packer.
However, grams of longer instruction sequences are not as common across all msfencode
packed executables. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 affirm this. The top 2-grams are more common
between all msfencode packed executables while the top 5-grams are less common. This
results in lower information gain for higher sized grams concerning the polymorphic
msfencode class and thus lower accuracies.
Table 4.4: Presence of top 2-grams (based on information gain for all samples) in
polymorhpic (msfencode) class and non-polymorphic class executables
2-Gram Rank 2-Gram Presence in Msfencode Presence in Non-Msfencode
1 (nop/jmp) 396 of 405 4 of 2097
2 (push/nop) 395 of 405 10 of 2097
3 (call/nop) 390 of 405 4 of 2097
4 (jump/nop) 376 of 405 3 of 2097
5 (nop/call) 343 of 405 4 of 2097
Table 4.5: Presence of top 5-grams (based on information gain for all samples) in
polymorhpic (msfencode) class and non-polymorphic class executables
5-Gram Rank 5-Gram Presence in Msfencode Presence in Non-Msfencode
1 (nop/jmp/mov/nop/jmp/) 238 of 405 0 of 2097
2 (nop/jmp/call/nop/jmp/) 193 of 405 0 of 2097
3 (nop/jmp/push/nop/jmp/) 176 of 405 0 of 2097
4 (push/nop/jmp/push/nop/) 174 of 405 0 of 2097
5 (jmp/mov/nop/jmp/mov/) 173 of 405 0 of 2097
The stratified 10-fold cross-validation method used for experiments also provides
another explanation for the sharp drop in accuracy achieved by grams of size 5. Because
there are fewer 5-grams common across all msfencode packed executables, training sets
38
may not reflect actual information gain of a gram for the entire sample set. For example,
the top 5-gram, (nop/jmp/mov/nop/jmp/), for the polymorphic class is present in 238
out of the 405 msfencode packed executables and 0 of the 2097 non-msfencode packed
executables. Stratified 10-fold cross-validation for the polymorphic set produces folds that
contain roughly 40 msfencode packed executables and 209 non-msfencode packed
executables. As an extreme example, random sampling fold generation might produce 5
folds that contain all 238 msfencode executables with the top 5-gram. If all 5 of these
folds are present in the training set, the gram remains the top gram and therefore splits the
J48 decision tree produced. However, because no msfencode packed executable in the test
set contains the top gram, a greater number of false negatives, or lower true positives, are
likely. This explains accuracy and true positive rates obtained using different gram
configurations for the polymorphic class.
Figure 4.1: Comparison of information gains (computed by Weka) for 2-gram operands
included and excluded configurations in polymorphic class
The average accuracy for the 1 and 2-gram with operands configurations are slightly
higher than their counterpart without operand configurations. Although the differences are
not statistically significant at the 0.99 confidence level, this difference is explained by the
information gained with operands included. Figure 4.1 shows the differences of these
information gains, calculated using Weka’s information gain attribute evaluation method,
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between 2-grams with and without operands included. The 2-grams with operands
included clearly shows higher information gains than those for operands excluded. This
distinguishes msfencode’s polymorphic engine against all other executables and reveals
operands are not morphed across all instructions and instruction sequences for msfencode
packed executables. However, accuracy for 3, 4, and 5-gram without operands decrease at
a smaller rate than 3, 4, and 5-gram configurations with operands. Relatively sharp drops
in accuracy for the 5-grams places them lower by 0.917% and 1.469% for operands
excluded and included respectively. Grams become too specific and less common across
msfencode packed executables for sequences of two instructions and including operands
seems to multiply the reduction in performance (cf. Figures B.1.
4.1.1.3 Packed class. Performances observed for the packed class are lower
overall than those for the UPX, ASPack, and polymorphic (msfencode) classes (cf.
Figure 4.6). This seems intuitive based on the relative greater diversity of executables in
the class. Specifically, the packed class consists of all 1879 packed executables and is
classified against the 623 non-packed executables used in all experiments. Therefore,
detection is generalized to a packed or not-packed result versus detection of a specific type
of packer, as is the case for the UPX, ASPack, and polymorphic classes. Performance
results show the 1-gram, operands excluded, configuration providing the significantly best
performance for accuracy and false positive rate. Consequently, this suggests there are
sets of common instructions across some packed executables that are not common across
other non-packed executables, and vice-versa. This is evident based on the decision tree
generated in Figure 4.2.
No other significant performance differences are observed between all other
configurations. However, the steep drop in accuracy observed for the polymorphic class is
not observed in results for the packed class, despite the presence of all msfencode packed
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Table 4.6: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for i-grams on
Packed class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
PACKED/1 Gram/Excluded 99.34656 99.24521 – 99.44791 0.99611 0.99524 – 0.99698 0.01454 0.01138 – 0.01769
PACKED/1 Gram/Included 98.61909 98.48942 – 98.74876 0.99566 0.99461 – 0.99672 0.04238 0.03756 – 0.04719
PACKED/2 Gram/Excluded 98.84499 98.72695 – 98.96302 0.99492 0.99396 – 0.99588 0.03106 0.02723 – 0.03488
PACKED/2 Gram/Included 98.65911 98.53173 – 98.78649 0.99867 0.99813 – 0.9992 0.04984 0.04481 – 0.05488
PACKED/3 Gram/Excluded 98.73705 98.61479 – 98.85932 0.99308 0.992 – 0.99416 0.02985 0.02574 – 0.03397
PACKED/3 Gram/Included 98.55716 98.41526 – 98.69906 0.99662 0.9959 – 0.99734 0.04776 0.04224 – 0.05327
PACKED/4 Gram/Excluded 99.09676 98.9907 – 99.20283 0.99811 0.99758 – 0.99864 0.03058 0.02656 – 0.0346
PACKED/4 Gram/Included 98.43926 98.30289 – 98.57563 0.99646 0.99566 – 0.99727 0.05201 0.04692 – 0.0571
PACKED/5 Gram/Excluded 98.97691 98.858 – 99.09582 0.99822 0.99756 – 0.99887 0.03571 0.03121 – 0.0402
PACKED/5 Gram/Included 98.40535 98.26249 – 98.5482 0.99715 0.99639 – 0.99791 0.05546 0.04994 – 0.06098
Figure 4.2: J48 decision tree (generated by Weka) for 1-gram operands excluded for packed
class, all samples used
executables in the packed class. Once again, fold creation and information gain provide an
explanation. The top 10 5-grams for both operand included and excluded configurations
are present in most of the 623 non-packed executables and not present in most of the
packed executables. Therefore, all folds generated have a higher probability of containing
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grams with high information gain and thus negative classification impacts incurred and
previously discussed for the polymorphic class are not incurred by the packed class for
5-gram configurations.
4.1.2 Results for i-grams across classes independent of gram size and operand
inclusion
Overall, classification results vary greatly based on the presence or absence of
polymorphic packed executables. Performance details are discussed further.
Better i-gram performance for non-polymorphic packed executables is shown in
Table 4.7. When the size and operand inclusion factors are ignored, UPX is classified with
the highest average accuracy of 99.968% due to higher true positive rates and lower false
positive rates than any other classified class. ASPack is detected with nearly the same
performance of UPX with an average accuracy lower by a difference of 0.23 in percent,
true positive rate lower by a difference of 0.011, and false positive rate higher by a
difference of 4.9e-4. The low false positive rate indicates nearly perfect identification of
non-ASPack executables.
Table 4.7: Average i-gram classification results for each class
Class Accuracy True Positive Rate False Positive Rate
UPX 99.96762 0.99985 0.00039
ASPack 99.73723 0.98799 0.00088
Poly 98.89426 0.93869 0.00134
Packed 98.76822 0.99650 0.03892
Classification for msfencode and the classification of the combined packed set of
UPX, ASPack, msfencode, yoda, mpress, npack, pepack, and fsg executables show
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significant differences from the UPX and ASPack classified sets. Polymorphic
classification attains an average accuracy of 98.894% across folds. Packed classification
attains a statistically significant lower average classification accuracy of 98.768%. The
polymorphic performance is largely explained by the overall lower true positive rate, a
result of polymorphic modules being misclassified as non-polymorphic. Although results
for the packed class shows a true positive rate on par with the true positive rate for UPX, it
suffers from a high false positive rate that is roughly 29 times that of the polymorphic and
nearly a 100 times that of the UPX false positive rates. This explains the overall higher
accuracy for polymorphic class detection.
4.1.3 Results for i-grams across gram sizes independent of class and operand
inclusion
Overall, 2-grams perform the best closely followed by 1 and 3-grams. Poorer
performance for 4-grams and a significantly poorer performance by 5-grams is observed.
Results are discussed in detail below.
Two-grams attain the highest average accuracy, 99.496%, when classification class
and operand inclusion factors are ignored as shown in Figure 4.3. The Tukey Honest
Significant Difference (HSD) plot in Figure 4.4 shows 2-gram accuracies are not
significantly different from 1 and 3-grams at the 0.99 confidence level, however, 2-gram
true positive rates are the highest and do show significant difference from all other sizes
(cf. Figures B.4 and B.5).
The lowest false positive rates are achieved by 1-grams, at 8.2e-3, with a statistically
significant difference from 2-grams, at 1.08e-2 (Figures B.6 and B.7). The poorest false
positive rate occurs with 5-grams at 1.22e-2. This suggests simpler i-grams are better at
recognizing executables outside the classification class tested. Both 4 and 5-gram sizes
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Figure 4.4: Tukey HSD plot comparing different i-gram sizes by accuracy
earlier, these gram sizes are poorer choices for detecting executables created by
msfencode.
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4.1.4 Results for i-grams across operand inclusion and exclusion
configurations independent of gram size and class
Grams without operands perform better when gram size and class factors are not
considered. Accuracy is 0.15849 higher in percent, true positive rate is higher by 7.12e-3,
and false positive rate is lower by 4.36e-3 for exclusion versus inclusion of operands
independent of class and gram size factors (cf. Table 4.8). The differences are all
statistically significant at the 0.99 confidence level.
Table 4.8: Average i-gram results for operand inclusion
Operands Accuracy True Positive Rate False Positive Rate
no 99.42108 0.98432 0.00820
yes 99.26259 0.97720 0.01256
As visible in previous figures and tables, grams with operands perform only slightly
better for the UPX and ASPack classes. However, operand inclusion results in statistically
significantly poorer classification for the polymorphic and combined classes when all
gram sizes are considered. A statistically insignificant exception exists for the
polymorphic class with the 1 and 2 gram sizes.
4.1.5 Best and worst i-gram configurations tested
The best and worst configurations are highly dependent on what is classified, but for
generalized use, this research argues 1 or 2-grams without operands provide the best
overall choice. Furthermore, any grams with sizes greater than 4 and any grams that
include operands should be avoided.
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Two-grams provide the most balanced results based on this research. As shown
earlier, they provide the best classification results for the polymorphic class and also
perform relatively well with the UPX and ASPack classes. However, 1-grams perform
nearly as well over all the classes and require less computational overhead as discussed in
the previous section. Furthermore, when polymorphic and combined packed performance
results are combined, 1-grams are the most accurate(cf. Figures 4.5, B.8, and B.9). As
observed earlier, two-grams without operands provide a statistically significant 0.091%
gain in accuracy over 1-grams without operands for detection of polymorphic class
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of accuracies for the polymorphic and packed classes
Operands, as created and tested for this research, are not worth including. The time
required to compute and perform information gain calculations for i-grams that include
operands require hours versus minutes to process for sizes greater than one. More
information gain calculations and sorting is required due to the much larger number of
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unique grams generated (cf. Figure 4.6). Memory requirements obviously increase as well
when operands are included. For these reasons, operands should be avoided in general
when using i-gram information gain calculations.





































Figure 4.6: Unique gram totals for i-gram configurations
Grams larger than 4 should also be avoided. As seen in previous figures, there is a
steep drop off in accuracy and true positive rate detecting the polymorphic class with
grams of size 5 even when operands are excluded. Of course UPX and ASPack perform at
or near perfect accuracy for these configurations. However, UPX and ASPack are easily
detected using signature based packer scanners such as PEiD. Although 3 and 4-gram
without operand configurations perform fairly well when results are observed across all
classes, they are not considered as top choices due to the larger number of grams they
generate.
In summary, the results of these i-gram experiments reveal that no particular i-gram
configuration works best for all packers, but 1 and 2-grams without operands are effective
for general and more practical purposes. Additionally, operands and grams with sizes
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greater than 4 should not be considered for classification use due to little or no detection
benefit gained and higher resource cost incurred.
4.2 Disassembly Based Feature Sets Results and Analysis
This section discusses the performance results for the disassembly based CFG, CFI,
and IL feature sets.
4.2.1 Results across all disassembly-based feature configurations
Results are discussed below for the non-polymorphic, polymorphic, and packed
classes. CFG, CFI, and IL feature set results are shown in Tables B.10, B.11, and B.12.
Consistent with i-gram results, UPX and ASPack classification results are higher than the
polymorphic and packed classes. As discussed earlier, both UPX and ASPack generate
highly static versions of packer stubs independent of the executable modules they
compress. Therefore, the control flow graph, control flow instruction, and intermediate
language attributes vary little between each module and thus provide more definitive
classification. Disassembly based feature values for UPX and ASPack executables
contrast well against other executables.
4.2.1.1 Non-polymorphic classes. The CFI set performs the best and the IL
set performs the worst for UPX. The CFI feature set achieves the highest overall average
accuracy, at 99.918%, highest true positive rate at 0.9984, and lowest false positive rate at
5.67e-4. Results for the CFI set are significantly different from the IL feature set with a
0.99 confidence level as shown in Figures B.13, B.14, and B.15. The IL feature set attains
an average accuracy of 99.726%, true positive rate of 0.994, and false positive rate of
1.594e-3. CFI feature set performance is better than IL performance because IL features
are more generalized than the CFI features. As with i-grams, UPX is detected better by
features that contain more specific context. The CFI set consists of percentage values for
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all instructions within a disassembly for an executable. Because most of the UPX packed
executables used in all experiments produce little or no variation between the
disassemblies generated for them, higher specificity results in better classification.
Table 4.9: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for disassembly
features on UPX class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
UPX/BasicCFG 99.78215 99.73805 – 99.82625 0.99438 0.99278 – 0.99599 0.00097 0.00056 – 0.00138
UPX/CF Ins 99.91805 99.88567 – 99.95043 0.99846 0.99761 – 0.99931 0.00057 0.00025 – 0.00089
UPX/IL 99.72621 99.66792 – 99.7845 0.99400 0.99238 – 0.99562 0.00159 0.00103 – 0.00216
ASPack results show the CFG feature set performs just slightly better than the CFI
set with average accuracy at 99.303% versus 99.293%, and true positive rate at 0.975
versus 0.9736 (cf. Table 4.10). However, the CFG set has a slightly higher average false
positive rate at 3.63e-3 versus 3.48e-3. Similar to the UPX results, the IL set shows poorer
overall performance than the other two sets for accuracy and true positive rate. The plots
in , have means that are significantly different between sets. Based on TukeyHSD results
(cf. Figures B.16, B.17 and B.18), CFI and IL set means are significantly different with
regard to accuracies. For true positive rates, the IL set true positive rate average is
significantly different from both the CFI and CFG sets. Finally, none of the sets show
significant difference between their average false positive rates. Once again, a reasonable
explanation for lower performance of the IL set is the more general nature of the IL set
feature values. The IL set is more generalized than the CFI set because it converts a larger
set of IA x86 instructions into a reduced set of only 17 possible instructions.
4.2.1.2 Polymorphic (msfencode) class. Results for the polymorphic class
show better performance for IL features as shown in Table 4.11. Specifically, the IL set
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Table 4.10: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for disassembly
features on ASPack class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
ASPACK/BasicCFG 99.30252 99.19269 – 99.41234 0.97501 0.97027 – 0.97974 0.00363 0.00281 – 0.00444
ASPACK/CF Ins 99.29263 99.20523 – 99.38002 0.97360 0.96915 – 0.97806 0.00348 0.00279 – 0.00417
ASPACK/IL 99.14663 99.05175 – 99.24151 0.96540 0.96028 – 0.97053 0.00370 0.0029 – 0.0045
performs best, CFI second, and CFG worst. The more general IL set of features attain a
detection accuracy of 99.011% versus the CFG set with a statistically significant 98.721%
(cf. Figure B.19). The IL set attains a higher true positive rate average of 0.9576 versus
the CFI set, at 0.9504, and CFG set, at 0.9390 with statistically significant difference from
the CFG set (cf. Figure B.20). All sets perform roughly the same with respect to false
alarms with means between 3.48e-3 for CFG and 3.72e-3 for CFI and no significance in
difference between any features sets (cf. Figure B.21).
Table 4.11: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for disassembly
features on Poly class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
POLY/BasicCFG 98.72104 98.5911 – 98.85097 0.93902 0.93217 – 0.94588 0.00348 0.00273 – 0.00423
POLY/CF Ins 98.88496 98.78034 – 98.98957 0.95042 0.94478 – 0.95606 0.00372 0.00283 – 0.00461
POLY/IL 99.01079 98.89832 – 99.12326 0.95758 0.95201 – 0.96314 0.00360 0.00275 – 0.00445
The IL performance suggests the instruction types (i.e. control flow, arithmetic, etc)
that msfencode generates are somewhat consistent across iterations. The performance of
CFI and CFG sets perform well and can characterize the polymorphic traits of msfencode.
The performance of the CFG set suggests that the control flow graph structural features
used have consistent values across iterations of msfencode. The same is true for the
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control flow instructions. Good detection results for the CFI set indicate control flow
instruction percentage values for the polymorphic class contrast well against the values of
executables not in the polymorphic class.
4.2.2 Packed class
As is the case for i-grams, detection results are lowest for the packed class (cf.
Table 4.12. The average true positive rate for the packed class is higher than ASPack and
polymorphic true positive rates. However, the packed set results are based on 1879 packed
versus 623 non-packed modules which weights the false positive rate heavier in accuracy
calculations than those for the UPX, ASPack, and polymorphic classes. In these other
classes true positive rate has greater impact on accuracy. The CFG set provides the lowest
detection rates for the packed class. It attains an average accuracy of 98.076%, a
statistically significant lower accuracy than 98.667% and 98.521% for the CFI and IL
features sets respectively (cf. Figure B.22). The CFG class results in an average false
positive rate of 0.0472, significantly different from the CFI rate of 0.0296 and IL rate of
0.0343 (cf. Figure B.23). The higher false positive rate indicates more non-packed
modules are misclassified as packed. Therefore, the CFG attributes of more non-packed
modules are possibly not as discernible from the packed modules as those for the CFI and
IL attributes.
Table 4.12: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for disassembly
features on Packed class
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
PACKED/BasicCFG 98.07561 97.91251 – 98.23871 0.98986 0.98853 – 0.99118 0.04725 0.04187 – 0.05262
PACKED/CF Ins 98.66699 98.54207 – 98.7919 0.99195 0.99076 – 0.99314 0.02956 0.02582 – 0.0333
PACKED/IL 98.52114 98.39479 – 98.64749 0.99155 0.99034 – 0.99277 0.03429 0.03052 – 0.03805
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A significant difference exists between the CFI, at 0.9916, and CFG, at 0.9899, true
positive rates but not between these and the IL set, at 0.9915 (cf. Figure B.24). The true
positive rate performance of the CFG attributes indicates that packed modules are missed
by the classifiers more often than for the CFI and IL set based classifiers. Thus CFG
feature values cannot discriminate packed from non-packed executables as effectively as
the CFI and IL sets.
4.2.3 Results for disassembly features across classes independent of feature set
Classification results for the UPX, ASPack, polymorphic, and packed classes mimic
results for i-grams (cf. Figure 4.7). UPX is detected with highest average accuracy,
ASPack with second, the polymorphic class third, and finally the packed class fourth. All
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of class accuracies
Since UPX and ASPack tools produce “signature-like” code in files they compress,
this provides better discrimination between the executables within the two classes versus
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Differences in mean levels of Classes for Accuracy
Figure 4.8: Comparison of class accuracies
accuracy because the UPX versions and settings used in the experiments produce virtually
no change in the instructions disassembled or control flow graphs generated. Most
ASPack versions, however, showed significant variation between their outputs.
Polymorphic classification results top those for the packed class due to higher information
gain attained by msfencode disassembly features versus those for the more diversified
packed and non-packed classes.
4.2.4 Results for disassembly features across feature sets independent of class
The CFI feature set is the best choice of the three utilized based on a combination of
its generally high performance and relatively modest computational costs. In contrast, the
CFG feature set is the worst classifier due to its significantly worse performance across the
polymorphic and packed classes.
When results are combined for all classes, the CFI set attains the highest accuracy
and true positive rate and the lowest false positive rate (cf. Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11).
The CFI set also achieves the highest accuracy for the packed class, but the IL set attains
the highest accuracy for the polymorphic class. However, both the difference between the
53
CFI and IL accuracies for polymorphic and packed classification are not significant at the
0.99 confidence level (cf. Figures B.19 and B.22). Computationally the CFI features
require less time and fewer resources to compute than the IL set, which must convert
every disassembled instruction into its intermediate form. For this reason and its overall
better performance, the CFI set is the best choice between the three feature sets.
Regarding the worst choice, the CFG features provided the lowest performance
relative to the other two sets for both the polymorphic and packed classes with significant
differences at the 0.99 confidence level. In addition, the CFG features require
computational resources above those for the CFI features. Even so, the features
themselves could be considered for classification purposes. Although they are less
effective than the other sets, they still provide an average accuracy near 99% and require
somewhat less computational resources than the IL set. In addition, they might provide for


























































































Figure 4.11: Comparison of false positive rates for feature sets
4.3 Comparison of i-gram and structural and disassembly based features–What
top feature sets are the best and worst for packer classification?
Based on performance results and qualitative estimates of the computational
resources required to extract features for each configuration, 1-grams, operands excluded,
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provide the best choice in general for packer classification compared to 2-grams and the
CFI feature set. However, 2-grams should be considered for polymorphic purposes when
the highest detection accuracy and true positive rate is desired. Finally, the CFI feature set
shows promise but achieves the lowest performance between all three.
One-grams without operands provide the best overall effectiveness for cost. As
mentioned in section previously, 1-grams without operands perform relatively well
compared to the other i-gram configurations and require less computational resources than
2-grams without operands. In addition, they outperform the CFI attributes with statistical
significance for all performance metrics across polymorphic, packed, and all classes
combined, except for the polymorphic classification false positive rate (cf.
Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15). The Tukey HSD p-values in Tables 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18
indicate significant difference between the means at the 0.99 confidence level. The
difference in computational resources between 1-grams and the CFI attributes are small
because both require the inspection of all disassembled instructions within classified
executables. Therefore, 1-grams are chosen as the best general purpose features for
classification of packers.
Table 4.13: Performance averages for top choices (All classes)
Feature Set Accuracy True Positive Rate False Positive Rate
2 Grm 99.51740 0.99054 0.00853
1 Grm 99.42596 0.98375 0.00566
CF Ins 99.19066 0.97861 0.00933
Although 2-grams are more resource intensive than both 1-grams and the CFI
attributes, they provide the highest polymorphic classification performance. Based on the
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Table 4.14: Performance averages for top choices (Polymorphic class)
Feature Set Accuracy True Positive Rate False Positive Rate
2 Grm 99.50239 0.97745 0.00157
1 Grm 99.19060 0.96865 0.00360
CF Ins 98.88496 0.95042 0.00372
Table 4.15: Performance averages for top choices (Packed class)
Feature Set Accuracy True positive Rate False positive rate
1 Grm 99.34656 0.99611 0.01454
2 Grm 98.84499 0.99492 0.03106
CF Ins 98.66699 0.99195 0.02956
significantly higher average accuracy, higher true positive rate, and lower false positive
rate than either 1-grams or the CFI features for the msfencode executables, 2-grams might
also provide better discrimination for other polymorphic type tools. Furthermore, based
on successful classification for the polymorphic class, 2-grams might provide
classification for other purposes, such as identifying modules or procedures that provide
similar functions but whose disassemblies are different.
The CFI features used in these experiments are a poorer choice than 1-grams for
detecting polymorphic or packed classes, but show that simple statistics based on a
relatively few number of control flow instructions can still provide good classification
results. For this reason, more investigation into simple statistics based on executable
disassemblies should be done.
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Table 4.16: Tukey HSD mean comparisons for accuracy (ACC), true positive rate (TPR),
and false positive rate (FPR) for all classes
Configurations Compared p-val ACC p-val HR p-val FAR
2-Gram vs 1-Gram 0.00720 0.00000 0.00028
CFI vs 1-Gram 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000
CFI vs 2-Gram 0.00000 0.00000 0.51412
Table 4.17: Tukey HSD mean comparisons for accuracy (ACC), true positive rate(TPR),
and false positive rate(FPR) for polymorphic class
Configurations Compared p-val ACC p-val HR p-val FAR
2-Gram vs 1-Gram 0.00000 0.00456 0.00001
CFI vs 1-Gram 0.00000 0.00000 0.95870
CFI vs 2-Gram 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Table 4.18: Tukey HSD mean comparisons for accuracy, true positive rate, and false alarm
rate for packed class
Configurations Compared p-val ACC p-val HR p-val FAR
2-Gram vs 1-Gram 0.00000 0.07780 0.00000
CFI vs 1-Gram 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
CFI vs 2-Gram 0.01287 0.00000 0.72377
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4.4 Summary of results and analysis
This section argues both 1 and 2-grams without operands provide the best overall
classification for the packers tested. Both perform well with average detection accuracies
above 98.84% true positive rates above 0.969, and false positive rates below 0.031 across
all four of the classes used in the experiments. In addition, both use fewer resources than
i-grams of greater sizes and with operands. For polymorphic type detection purposes,
2-grams are better but 1-grams may provide better classification results for diversified
classes. Simple disassembly based features also provide good packer detection results
with average detection accuracies above 98.08%, true positive rates above 0.939, and false




The results of this research answer several classification performance questions
regarding i-grams and the CFG, CFI, and IL feature sets. I-grams classify and detect
executables packed by both polymorphic and non-polymorphic packer tools with high
accuracy, high hit rates, and low false alarm rates. Two-grams without operands provide
an average accuracy above 99.5%, average hit rate above 0.977, and average false alarm
rate below 1.6e-3 for Metasploit’s msfencode executable output. Thus i-grams might
detect other polymorphic tools as well if trained and tested. Regarding the best i-gram
configuration, results both agree and disagree with previous results [14, 21]. Specifically,
good performance for 2-grams without operands is observed, but 1-grams without
operands also show good performance results and with fewer i-grams. Operand inclusion
for i-grams leads to small performance gains over operand exclusion in some cases, but
with much higher computational costs, adding millions more i-grams for gram sizes
greater than 1.
Classification performance and computational requirements for the CFG, CFI, and IL
sets indicate the CFI feature set is the best choice of the three. The best choice between
the top two i-gram configurations and the CFI feature set are 1 and 2-grams based on
statistically significant higher performance results and resource requirements.
5.2 Research Impact
This research demonstrates that machine learning with sequences of disassembled
instructions and simple disassembly based features is successful for classification of the
packed executables used for experiments within this research. These methods might prove
useful for classification against larger sets of packed and non-packed executables. More
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importantly, these methods might provide useful solutions to other software security
issues beyond the packer problem. Finally, this research expands upon previous
instruction sequence related efforts. It confirms 2-grams as one of the best configurations
for classification and tests the inclusion of generalized operands.
5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 Test i-grams and disassembly based features at procedural level
One technique employed by sophisticated malware creators involves deliberately not
using obfuscation tools, but rather hiding malicious code in plain sight. Approaching
problems at a more granular level, such as identification of procedures within an
executable based on their functions, might provide high level information about an
arbitrary executable useful for determining malicious or non-malicious intent. The i-gram
and disassembly based features used in this research might provide the accurate
classification necessary at this granular level.
5.3.2 Add inter-procedural support to i-grams
This research used i-grams based on and restricted to intra-procedural control flow.
Expanding i-grams to include inter-procedural control flow information might yield higher
performance results. This would require a more elaborate i-gram extraction procedure, as
the order calls are invoked would have to be maintained.
5.3.3 Time and resource performance improvement and analysis
This research addresses the classification performance of i-grams and makes only
obvious remarks regarding resources. The number of i-grams generated by each
configuration was used to qualitatively compare and estimate the resources needed.
However, if i-grams are to be used practically at an enterprise level, the time and resources
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required to extract, store, and use them should be measured. In addition, streamlining the
processes required by i-grams should also be considered for practicality purposes.
5.3.4 Frequency based i-gram classification
This research limits the values of i-grams to either present or not present values.
Incorporating frequency type information, similar to the averages and percentage values
used for CFG, CFI, and IL features sets, might provide performance improvements for
i-grams.
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APPENDIX A: All Confusion Matrices
This appendix provides all confusion matrices based on average TP, FP, TN, and FN
values for all experiments conducted by configuration. As discussed in the experimental
methodology chapter, a TP occurs when the classifier correctly identifies an executable in
the class specified by the configuration. A FP occurs when an executable not in the class
specified by the configuration is classified as such. A TN occurs when an executable not
in the class specified is classified as such. Finally, a FN occurs when an executable in the
class specified is classified as an executable not in the class.
Table A.1: Confusion matrix for all configurations based on 10-fold, cross-validation for
all classes
Configuration TP FP TN FN
ASPACK/1 Gram/Excluded 38.1 0.4 210.6 1.1
ASPACK/1 Gram/Included 38.8 0.0 211.0 0.4
ASPACK/2 Gram/Excluded 38.8 0.2 210.8 0.4
ASPACK/2 Gram/Included 38.8 0.4 210.6 0.4
ASPACK/3 Gram/Excluded 38.8 0.2 210.8 0.4
ASPACK/3 Gram/Included 38.8 0.0 211.0 0.4
ASPACK/4 Gram/Excluded 38.8 0.0 211.0 0.4
ASPACK/4 Gram/Included 38.8 0.0 211.0 0.4
ASPACK/5 Gram/Excluded 38.8 0.7 210.3 0.4
ASPACK/5 Gram/Included 38.8 0.0 211.0 0.4
ASPACK/BasicCFG 38.2 0.8 210.2 1.0
ASPACK/CF Ins 38.2 0.7 210.3 1.0
ASPACK/IL 37.8 0.8 210.2 1.4
PACKED/1 Gram/Excluded 187.2 0.9 61.4 0.7
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PACKED/1 Gram/Included 187.1 2.6 59.7 0.8
PACKED/2 Gram/Excluded 186.9 1.9 60.4 1.0
PACKED/2 Gram/Included 187.7 3.1 59.2 0.2
PACKED/3 Gram/Excluded 186.6 1.9 60.4 1.3
PACKED/3 Gram/Included 187.3 3.0 59.3 0.6
PACKED/4 Gram/Excluded 187.5 1.9 60.4 0.4
PACKED/4 Gram/Included 187.2 3.2 59.1 0.7
PACKED/5 Gram/Excluded 187.6 2.2 60.1 0.3
PACKED/5 Gram/Included 187.4 3.5 58.8 0.5
PACKED/BasicCFG 186.9 2.9 58.5 1.9
PACKED/CF Ins 187.3 1.8 59.6 1.5
PACKED/IL 187.2 2.1 59.3 1.6
POLY/1 Gram/Excluded 39.2 0.8 208.9 1.3
POLY/1 Gram/Included 38.9 0.0 209.7 1.6
POLY/2 Gram/Excluded 39.6 0.3 209.4 0.9
POLY/2 Gram/Included 39.6 0.2 209.5 0.9
POLY/3 Gram/Excluded 39.4 0.7 209.0 1.1
POLY/3 Gram/Included 38.4 0.0 209.7 2.1
POLY/4 Gram/Excluded 38.6 0.2 209.5 1.9
POLY/4 Gram/Included 36.7 0.0 209.7 3.8
POLY/5 Gram/Excluded 36.6 0.6 209.1 3.9
POLY/5 Gram/Included 33.1 0.1 209.6 7.4
POLY/BasicCFG 38.0 0.7 209.0 2.5
POLY/CF Ins 38.5 0.8 208.9 2.0
POLY/IL 38.8 0.8 208.9 1.7
UPX/1 Gram/Excluded 64.9 0.5 184.7 0.1
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UPX/1 Gram/Included 65.0 0.1 185.1 0.0
UPX/2 Gram/Excluded 65.0 0.1 185.1 0.0
UPX/2 Gram/Included 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/3 Gram/Excluded 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/3 Gram/Included 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/4 Gram/Excluded 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/4 Gram/Included 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/5 Gram/Excluded 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/5 Gram/Included 65.0 0.0 185.2 0.0
UPX/BasicCFG 64.6 0.2 185.0 0.4
UPX/CF Ins 64.9 0.1 185.1 0.1
UPX/IL 64.6 0.3 184.9 0.4
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APPENDIX B: Various Graphical Plots of Accuracy, TPR, FPR Results and
Associated Mean Comparison Plots
This appendix provides graphical views of results that complement discussion and
tables listed in the results and analysis chapter.
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Figure B.3: False positive rates for all i-gram configurations across all classes
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Figure B.7: Tukey HSD plot comparing different i-gram sizes by false positive rate
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 True Positive Rates Across Polymorphic and Packed






































































































False Positive Rates Across Polymorphic and Packed































































































Figure B.9: Comparison of false positive rates for the polymorphic and packed classes
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Figure B.12: Comparison of false positive rates for disassembly based features
B.4 Mean Comparisons for UPX Class Disassembly-based Feature Configurations
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Figure B.13: Tukey HSD comparison plot of UPX accuracies for disassembly based
features
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Figure B.14: Tukey HSD comparison plot of UPX true positive rates for disassembly based
features
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Figure B.15: Tukey HSD comparison plot of UPX false positive rates for disassembly
based features
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B.5 Mean Comparisons for ASPack Class Disassembly-based Feature
Configurations
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Figure B.16: Tukey HSD comparison plot of ASPack accuracies for disassembly based
features
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Figure B.17: Tukey HSD comparison plot of ASPack true positive rates for disassembly
based features
74

























G 99% family−wise confidence level
















Figure B.18: Tukey HSD comparison plot of ASPack false positive rates for disassembly
based features
B.6 Mean Comparisons for Polymorphic Class Disassembly-based Feature
Configurations
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Figure B.19: Tukey HSD comparison plot of polymorphic accuracies for disassembly based
features
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Figure B.20: Tukey HSD comparison plot of polymorphic true positive rates for
disassembly based features
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Figure B.21: Tukey HSD comparison plot of polymorphic false positive rates for
disassembly based features
76
B.7 Mean Comparisons for Polymorphic Class Disassembly-based Feature
Configurations
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Figure B.22: Tukey HSD comparison plot of packed accuracies for disassembly based
features
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Figure B.23: Tukey HSD comparison plot of packed false positive rates for disassembly
based features
77

























G 99% family−wise confidence level
















Figure B.24: Tukey HSD comparison plot of packed true positive rates for disassembly
based features
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APPENDIX C: Polymorphic Pilot Study Test Results for Polymorphic (msfencode)
Class versus Non-Packed
This section provides the results of a pilot study conducted with all 405 of the
msfencode packed executables classified against 619 of the 623 non-packed executables
used in the final experiments. These results show similar performances for various i-gram
configurations compared to final results gathered.
Table C.1: Average accuracies, TPRs, and FPRs with confidence intervals for i-grams on
poly pilot test
Configuration Avg. ACC 99% CI Avg. TPR 99% CI Avg. FPR 99% CI
POLY/1 Gram/Excluded 99.77546 99.69161 – 99.85932 0.99926 0.99816 – 1.00036 0.00323 0.002 – 0.00446
POLY/1 Gram/Included 98.79388 98.62207 – 98.96569 0.98060 0.97647 – 0.98473 0.00727 0.00485 – 0.00968
POLY/2 Gram/Excluded 99.34100 99.17223 – 99.50976 0.99840 0.9965 – 1.00029 0.00985 0.00737 – 0.01234
POLY/2 Gram/Included 98.92561 98.75459 – 99.09663 0.97777 0.97387 – 0.98167 0.00323 0.00193 – 0.00453
POLY/3 Gram/Excluded 99.24310 99.08369 – 99.40251 0.99209 0.9894 – 0.99478 0.00735 0.00531 – 0.00939
POLY/3 Gram/Included 98.36370 98.15111 – 98.57629 0.95859 0.95319 – 0.96398 0.00000 0.00000 – 0.00000
POLY/4 Gram/Excluded 97.10504 96.83368 – 97.37639 0.97087 0.96569 – 0.97606 0.02884 0.02468 – 0.033
POLY/4 Gram/Included 98.01309 97.764 – 98.26218 0.95014 0.94391 – 0.95637 0.00024 -0.00012 – 6e-04
POLY/5 Gram/Excluded 97.80273 97.54015 – 98.06531 0.99360 0.99096 – 0.99625 0.03215 0.02807 – 0.03624
POLY/5 Gram/Included 96.05054 95.70922 – 96.39187 0.98098 0.97682 – 0.98515 0.05292 0.04787 – 0.05796
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Table C.2: Confusion matrix for all i-gram configurations in poly pilot test based on 10-
fold, cross-validation of msfencode executables versus non-packed executables)
Configuration TP FP TN FN
POLY/1 Gram/Excluded 40.5 0.2 61.7 0.0
POLY/1 Gram/Included 39.7 0.4 61.5 0.8
POLY/2 Gram/Excluded 40.4 0.6 61.3 0.1
POLY/2 Gram/Included 39.6 0.2 61.7 0.9
POLY/3 Gram/Excluded 40.2 0.5 61.4 0.3
POLY/3 Gram/Included 38.8 0.0 61.9 1.7
POLY/4 Gram/Excluded 39.3 1.8 60.1 1.2
POLY/4 Gram/Included 38.5 0.0 61.9 2.0
POLY/5 Gram/Excluded 40.2 2.0 59.9 0.3
POLY/5 Gram/Included 39.7 3.3 58.6 0.8
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